

Youth Political Participation and Social Media Use in Hong Kong

Research Report

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary	i
Chapter 1	1
Chapter 2	4
Chapter 3	11
Chapter 4	22
BIBLIOGRAPHY	26
Appendix 1.1: An Overview of the Fieldwork for the Telephone Survey.....	28
Appendix 3.1: Questionnaire from the Telephone Survey	29

Youth Political Participation and Social Media Use in Hong Kong Executive Summary

1. Background of the Study

- Youth have become a force for transformational change in Hong Kong. They have played a visible and prominent role in a number of political activities and policy debates.
- Youth participation in political activities is bolstered by social media, which has been used to share information and mobilize emotion and action. Various forms of online political participation are translated into offline engagement.
- There is a growing concern that social media operates as a catalyst for youth radicalization.
- This study aims to examine Hong Kong youth's online and offline political participation and their social media behaviors.
- Based on the findings, recommendations are made on how to optimize the use of social media to interact with youth and engage them in the social and political arenas.

2. Methodology

- A telephone survey was conducted between 24 October and 24 November 2016. A total of 829 respondents aged 15 to 29 were successfully interviewed on their mobile phones. The response rate was 70%.

3. Telephone Survey on Youth Political Participation and Social Media Use in Hong Kong

3.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics

- Sex: The 829 respondents were very evenly split between males (50.5%) and females (49.5%).
- Age: 28.5% of the respondents were 15 to 19 years old, 34.3% were between 20 and 24, and 36.2% were between 25 and 29.
- Origin: A majority of respondents (77.8%) were born in Hong Kong, with 21.6% born somewhere else.
- Education: 44.1% of the respondents were degree holders and 11.1% had received non-degree tertiary education. Another 36.9% reported senior secondary as the highest level of education attained at the time of the survey, and 7.0% indicated junior secondary school, or primary school, or kindergarten as the highest, or no formal education.
- Respondents showed a strong sense of identification with Hong Kong, with 47.6% identifying themselves as "Hongkongers," while 37.5% said that they were "Hongkongers but also Chinese". Only 3.7% reported themselves as being "Chinese," with 9.9% identifying themselves as "Chinese but also Hongkongers."

3.2 Use of Internet and Social Media

- On average, our respondents spent four to five hours online daily and one to two hours on Facebook.
- Facebook was the most frequently used social media platform (67.7%), followed by WhatsApp (14.4%) Instagram (12.2%) and WeChat (3.4%). Notably, Instagram was far more popular among youth aged 15 to 19 (29.2%) than in the older cohorts. This is consistent with findings from international studies that millennials tend not to use Facebook as much as older groups.
- “Browsing friends’ statuses” was the most common activity for youth in using social media (24.1%), followed by “browsing public affairs news” (20.9%), “instant messaging” (11.6%), “browsing information of living and lifestyle” (10.1%), “sharing others’ post” (6.6%), and “pressing ‘Like’ or other emotional buttons” (6.6%). The other activities including “watching video”, “browsing information of entertainment”, and “browsing comments”, etc. contributed the rest of the 3.4%.
- Social media was the respondents’ major source of public affairs information (46.4%), followed by television (21.7%), websites (15.5%), newspapers and magazines (13.1%), and radio (2.8%).

3.3 Political attitude and political participation

- Two thirds of the respondents (65.7%) were “very dissatisfied” or “not quite satisfied” with the performance of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government. By contrast, only 3.2% were “very satisfied” or “quite satisfied,” with 29.8% reporting “half and half.”
- Trust in the HKSAR Government was low, with 63.0% of respondents indicating they “very distrust” or “quite distrust” of the HKSAR Government, 7.8% “very trust” or “quite trust,” and 28.5% “half and half.”
- In order to study respondents’ tolerance of minority or non-conformist groups, we asked how objectionable they would regard it if the following groups of people strove for their rights publicly, with the percentages indicating “not objectionable at all” as follows: recovered mental patients: 87.7%; people of other ethnicities: 79.6%; homosexuals: 75.2%; sex workers: 70.7%; and political radicals: 37.9%.
- In terms of political participation, respondents were asked how often they participated in a variety of online and offline political activities. For the data analysis, “never” was given zero points, “once/twice” was given one point, “several times” was given two points, and “often” was given three points. Among different kinds of online political activities, “Post and share political and public affairs information or comment online” received the highest score (1.06), followed by “‘Like’ or join any online group about politics or public affairs” (0.80). Overall, 24.8% of respondents had never participated in any political activity online.
- Among offline political activities, “Take part in an offline march or demonstration” received the highest score (0.36), followed by “Wear or show a sign or symbol for any social movement (e.g. democracy movement, election)” (0.33). 44.4% of respondents had never participated in any offline political activity.
- 61.5% of respondents aged 18 to 29 voted in the 2016 Legislative Council Election.

3.4 Relationship between the use of social media as the primary source of public affairs information and political attitudes and participation

- Statistical test results revealed that respondents who used social media as their major source of public affairs information were significantly less satisfied with the performance of the HKSAR Government, less trust the HKSAR Government, and displayed a higher degree of online and offline political participation than other respondents.

4. Recommendations for government officials and policymakers

- The reliance on new media to obtain public affairs information greatly expands the need for media literacy among youth. More support should be given to help youth judge the credibility and accuracy of information found online, apply fact checks to the information they receive, become exposed to a wider range of perspectives, and develop a relatively independent attitude.
- Given the popularity of social media among youth, government should utilize this avenue to interact with youth in an open and friendly way to enhance mutual understanding and rebuild mutual trust. A positive image of the government should be established through social media to increase the presently low level of youth satisfaction with and trust in the government.
- Youth like to express their opinions about politics and social issues in a variety of ways online, so government officials and policymakers should acquire social media skills and collect, on a proactive basis, the views and concerns of youth to help address their needs in future policies and initiatives.
- Given the generally low level of political participation offline, it is an unfounded concern that youth are radical and pose a serious threat to social stability. However, the minority of politically active youth should not be ignored by policymakers. Repression featuring strong-arm tactics is not a suitable method of responding to these dissenting voices. On the contrary, it is imperative to widen channels for youth to express their dissent; otherwise, more public actions characterized by confrontation and vigorous expression of anti-establishment sentiments will likely occur.
- It is of crucial importance to encourage youth, the future pillars of society, to increase their level of civic engagement. There should be more promotion of community work on social media to mobilize youth to contribute to the development of civil society. When political institutions wish to invite youth to participate in formal political structures and processes, they should share the information online and use peer-to-peer contact—the social networks of today’s youth—to promote and facilitate youth engagement.
- Given their demonstration of high political tolerance of marginalized minorities, youth have the potential to help build bridges of dialogue between these groups and the general public. They should be empowered to play a role in enhancing an inclusive society.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1. Background

This study of youth political participation and social media use in Hong Kong was supported by the Faculty Strategic Development Fund of Faculty of Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Recent political and social developments are triggering changes in the very social fabric of Hong Kong society. The lack of trust in the government and frustration with unequal access to economic, social, and political opportunities have translated into a number of political activities and debates. Youth in Hong Kong, who are insufficiently represented and engaged in formal policymaking processes and traditional party politics, are turning to anti-establishment avenues for civic engagement. The Umbrella Movement was regarded as a turning point in youth political orientation from a peaceful, rational, and non-violent approach expressing concerns within the norms of the establishment to an anti-establishment approach that employed more assertive means, not excluding radical behavior.

In civic engagement among today's youth, social media has been widely adopted to express opinions, share information, mobilize in large numbers, and collaborate with different stakeholders in various political activities, both online and offline.

In recent social movements like the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the 2016 New Year's Night Unrest in Mong Kok, and the 2016 Legislative Council Election, social media provided a vital platform for information sharing and emotion mobilization.

Although the many existing findings regarding the impact of social media on youth's participation in politics are largely inconclusive (Fu, Wong, Law, & Yip, 2016), social media has been regarded as reinforcing youth's dissenting attitudes and radical behaviors (*Apple Daily*, 2016). Meanwhile, the rise of localism and radicalism, along with the advocacy of forceful resistance, have caused youth to be labeled as a social problem and made them the focus of moral panic among some (Chan, 2016).

2. Objectives

Youth in Hong Kong have demonstrated their aspiration and potential to be agents of social change. In light of recent events and democratic developments in Hong Kong, it is of the highest priority to take full account of their opinions, engage them in public affairs, and promote their rights.

Given the deepening penetration of social media in the lives of youth and their active role in political activities and debates, it is expected that a thorough understanding of the relationship between social media use behaviors among youth and their online and offline

political participation will help both the government and the public communicate with youth more effectively and to engage them in developing a civil society.

The specific objectives of the current study are as follows:

- (1) To examine Hong Kong youth's social media use and sources of public affairs information;
- (2) To investigate youth's attitudes toward the HKSAR Government;
- (3) To study the frequency of youth's participation in different kinds of online and offline political activities;
- (4) To examine youth's tolerance of minority or non-conformist groups;
- (5) To analyze the relationship between youth's social media use and their political participation and attitudes toward the HKSAR Government and non-conformist groups; and
- (6) On the basis of the study's findings, to understand as fully as possible the role of youth in social change and to generate impactful policy recommendations for facilitating communication between government and youth that will strengthen youth participation in politics and the development of civil society.

3. Coverage

In order to achieve the objectives stated above, we focus on the population of Hong Kong youth aged 15 to 29. The age groups for "youth" vary in different studies, depending on the subject matter concerned. The United Nations defines "youth" as young men and women between the ages of 15 and 24 years, an age range that Hong Kong has adopted as the target population in planning services for youth (Census and Statistics Department, 2013; UNESCO, n.d.). However, to include more people in the early stages of their working lives and allow for comparative study, we chose 15 to 29 as "youth" in the current study.

4. Methodology

This section presents the details of the telephone survey. Telephone interviews were facilitated with the aid of a structured questionnaire, which was manually handled by the interviewers via a computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) system.

The target population of the telephone survey was Cantonese-speaking permanent Hong Kong residents between 15 and 29 years old. For the sampling frame, mobile phone numbers were randomly generated using known prefixes assigned to telecommunication service providers under the Numbering Plan provided by the Office of the

Communications Authority (OFCA). Invalid numbers were eliminated by computer and manual dialing records to produce the final sample.

The fieldwork was carried out between 24 October and 24 November 2016. The entire telephone interview was conducted in the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at the Chinese University of Hong Kong; the fieldwork process was fully supervised. In this survey, a total of 123,374 random mobile phone numbers were initially used. Of these, 62,577 were identified as ineligible—“invalid” (55,930), “non-residential line” (162), “fax number” (229), “no eligible respondent”(6,256)—while another 59,606 were considered to have unknown eligibility: “no answer” (36,752), “line busy” (2,699), “password needed” (48), “international call” (637), “no eligible respondent identified” (19,470). In addition, 277 individuals refused to be interviewed and 85 eligible respondents were unavailable or terminated the interviews before they could be completed.

In the end, 829 eligible respondents were successfully interviewed (with a sampling error of +/- 3.4% at 95% confidence level). The response rate was 70%. Thus, the survey sample size achieved can be considered to produce survey findings with acceptable levels of precision. An overview of the fieldwork for the telephone survey is presented in Appendix 1.1.

5. Structure of the Report

The remainder of this report is structured as follows. We first review previous literature and surveys investigating political participation and the use of Internet and social media among Hong Kong youth. Second, the findings of the telephone survey are reported in Chapter 3. After summarizing and discussing the research results, we offer policy implications to facilitate communication between government officials and youth and to motivate youth to participate in the development of civil society.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

1. Youth Political Attitudes and Political Participation in Hong Kong

In previous studies, Hong Kong youth were generally dissatisfied with the government and tended to have negative attitudes toward and grievances about their upward social immobility and social development. Some young people were disillusioned with institutional political processes, felt that they were unable to change things, and thus acted as bystanders, while others with similar perceived political inefficacy actively engaged in social or political affairs, either in an effort to influence policy or at least voice their concerns.

The 2015/2016 Quality of Life of Youth Index indicated that the overall quality of life of youth in Hong Kong had declined slightly from the previous year. The indicators “satisfaction with youth policy” and “perceived impact on policy” declined by 6.03% and 10.19% respectively from the 2014/15 Index figures (Centre for Quality of Life, 2016).

Findings from a 2016 survey showed that youth aged 15–34 were not satisfied with the performance of the HKSAR Government, with an average rating score of 4.59 out of 10, where 10 is defined as “deeply satisfied.” When asked about ways to influence government policy, 23.7% of the 522 respondents felt that they were not influential at all, while nearly half of the respondents (45.0%) would choose to be a bystander by “do my best, such as working and studying hard,” and 21.2% of respondents would participate in civic activities, including “giving advice to the government (9.5%), “participating in social movements” (5.7%), “joining a consultation organization” (3.1%), “working for the government” (1.4%), “running for District Council or Legislative Council member” (1.3%), and other (0.2%) (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: How would you like to influence government policy? (*Instructions to interviewers: Read out options, choose one answer*)

	N	Percent
Do my best, such as working and studying hard	234	45.0
Give advice to the government	49	9.5
Participate in social movements	30	5.7
Join consultation organizations	16	3.1
Work for the government	7	1.4
Run for District Council or Legislative Council	7	1.3
Other	1	0.2
Do nothing	34	6.6
No individual influence at all	123	23.7
Don't know	19	3.6
Total	521	100.0

**The data are weighted.*

Source: The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups (2016), Table 4.7.

In a survey conducted among youth aged 18–34 in 2015, 59.0% of the 522 respondents were not willing to take up positions in public affairs (Table 1.2); the main reason was lack of interest (37.0%), followed by perceived incapability (22.7%) (Table 1.3). Only 28.2% showed such a willingness, and the main reason was to improve society (42.5%).

The unwillingness to take up positions in public affairs may also be explained by a perceived lack of efficacy in impacting policy. Two thirds of the youth did not believe that they were able to influence the development of social policy (65.2%). More than half of the respondents (51.4%) agreed that more influence could be wielded by establishing civic organizations than taking positions within institutionalized channels. Of all respondents, 63.6% reported distrust in the HKSAR Government, with 70.8% of this group unwilling to take up positions in public affairs.

The perceived lack of political efficacy was also indicated in a longitudinal study on youth values, which showed a decrease in the percentage of youth who agreed that public opinions could impact government policy, from 62.0% in 2012 to 50.9% in 2014 (The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, 2014a).

Table 1.2: Level of willingness to take up positions in public affairs

	N	Percent
Very willing	14	2.7
Willing	131	25.5
Not willing	233	45.5
Not willing at all	69	13.5
Don't know/Difficult to say	66	12.9
Total	512	100.0

**The data are weighted.*

Source: The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups (2015), Table 4.14.

Table 1.3: Reasons for unwillingness to take up positions in public affairs (*Instructions to interviewers: Do not read out options, choose one answer*)

	N	Percent
Not interested	111	37.0
Inability	68	22.7
Lack of time	44	14.6
Lack of knowledge	39	13.1
Not influential	24	7.9
Disagree on values	7	2.4
Other	1	0.2
Don't know/Difficult to say	7	2.2
Total	300	100.0

**The data are weighted.*

Source: The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups. (2015), Table 4.16.

While youth may not be interested in political participation within the norms of the establishment, the turnout rate of youth voters aged 18 to 30 has steadily increased in

recent years (Figures 2.1 and 2.2), and youth have also used more assertive means to take part in public affairs.

As a relatively heterogeneous society, Hong Kong is home to people with a variety of cultural, religious, moral, and political beliefs. Tolerance of difference and recognition of others' rights can contribute to social stability and harmony. A previous study has found that the younger generation is substantially more willing to extend citizen rights and liberties to disliked groups than older cohorts (Lee, 2014). This political tolerance is tested in the current study.

Voter turnout rates in Legislative Council Elections by age group, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016




Figure 2.1: Voter turnout rates in Legislative Council Elections by age group.

Source: Compiled according to the figures in “Women and Men in Hong Kong Key Statistics 2002, 2004, 2010, 2015, 2016” published by Census and Statistics Department and “Age Group and Sex of Voter Turnout by Geographical Constituency” released by Electoral Affairs Commission.

**Voter turnout rates in District Council Elections by age group,
1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015**



Figure 2.2: Voter turnout rates in District Council Elections by age group.

Source: Compiled according to the figures in “Women and Men in Hong Kong Key Statistics 2002, 2004, 2010, 2015, 2016” published by Census and Statistics Department.

According to a survey of social attitudes among the youth population in Hong Kong first conducted in 2010 and a follow-up study in 2014, the extent to which youth aged 20 to 34 participated in demonstrations or rallies since 1997 increased a total of 21.8%, and the percentage of respondents indicating that they “never” participated decreased from 67.5% in 2010 to 45.7% in 2014 (Table 1.4).

Table 1.4: Participation in demonstrations or rallies since 1997 (Percent)

	2014	2010
Never	45.7	67.5
Seldom	23.0	17.6
Several times	26.9	13.4
Often	4.4	1.5
N	(1079)	(952)

Source: Chiu and Lee (2016), Table 2.

Based on the data from a 2014 study, researchers built a typology of establishment and non-establishment political participation to find that 39.5% of youth aged 20 to 34 had both participated in demonstrations or rallies since 1997 and voted in the 2012 Legislative Council Election, while 25.1% had participated in neither activity.

Table 1.5: Types of political participation

		Demonstrations and rallies (Percent)	
		Yes	No
Voting in elections	Yes	39.4	20.4
	No	15.1	25.1

Source: Chiu and Lee (2016), Table 3.

2. Social Media as a Platform for Youth Political Participation

In Hong Kong, the slow pace of democratic reform and institutional arrangements favoring pro-government and pro-China political parties have led to contestation by pro-democracy parties, groups, and activists. While traditional media tends to be pro-establishment, the penetration of social media has engendered a thriving online space for communication of anti-establishment views and mobilization of social movements.

Youth are usually most enthusiastic about using social media and are earlier and easier adopters of new technologies. In fact, social media was widely exploited in several recent incidents of social unrest involving youth. For example, in 2014, Occupy Central protest organizers used their Facebook pages to articulate their agenda and disseminate mobilization information. The protestors used mobile phones and Facebook to post messages, photos, and video footage from the occupied areas for immediate sharing. The iconic yellow umbrella symbol was coopted by thousands of Facebook users as their profile picture to express their support for the protests (Chan, 2016).

Findings from a 2014 study showed that the Internet was the major channel for young people aged 15–39 to receive information on civic actions being organized (Table 2.1). Among different forms of online communication, social networking sites, particularly Facebook posts and private messages (54.7%) and Facebook Pages (51.5%), were the most popular channels for obtaining key information, followed by new online media (43.7%) and instant messaging (24.0%) (Table 2.2).

Table 2.1: Channels for learning about demonstrations or rallies being organized (Multiple responses allowed)

	Percent (N=1776)
Internet (computer, mobile phone, tablet)	74.3
TV	60.2
Printed newspapers	48.3
Informed orally by others	25.6
Radio	1.0
Banners or handbills	0.5
School/Teachers	0.5
On-street propaganda by political parties	0.1
Magazines	0.1
Other	0.1
Don't know/Forget	0.1

Source: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (2015), Table 3.4.

Table 2.2: How users of electronic communications learned about demonstration or rallies to be organized (Multiple responses allowed)

	Percent (N=1319)
Facebook posts/Private messages	54.7
Facebook Pages	51.5
New online media	43.7
Instant messaging	24.0
Blogs	8.8
Mobile phone (SMS) texts	7.8
Email	5.6
Online forums	2.3
Other	2.9
Don't know/Forget	2.0

Source: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (2015), Table 3.5.

Another survey (Hong Kong Ideas Centre, 2013) among those born in 1990 or later and aged 13 to 22 during the survey found that most respondents regarded websites as an important or very important channel to obtain information (86.8%), followed by Facebook (76.1%) and television (59.3%).

A survey of the information technology usage of youth aged 10 to 24 revealed that most of the 522 respondents had participated in social issues on social networking sites, including “liking others’ opinions” (76.4%), “commenting” (57.9%), “posting personal opinions/feelings” (56.5%), “sharing others’ opinions” (56.2%), “joining groups” (51.5%), and “founding a group” (16.8%) (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3: Participation in social issues on social networking sites (Percent)

	Often	Several times	Seldom	Never	Don't know/Difficult to say	Total
Like others’ opinions	21.7	35.6	19.1	23.2	0.4	100.0
Comment	7.9	23.2	26.8	41.7	0.4	100.0
Post personal opinion/feeling	6.2	22.1	28.3	43.4	0.4	100.0
Share others’ opinions	9.3	21.9	25.1	43.4	0.4	100.0
Join groups	6.5	21.5	23.4	47.6	0.8	100.0
Create a group	1.2	2.2	13.5	82.3	1.0	100.0

* *The data are weighted.*

Source: The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups (2014b), Table 4.6.5.

Social media has provided a convenient way for youth to share information about politics and public affairs, express their views on particular issues, and mobilize collective behaviors. However, active civic engagement online may not necessarily translate into offline actions.

A survey among those born in 1990 or later and aged 13 to 22 during the survey (Hong Kong Ideas Centre, 2013) found that although 47.6% of respondents reported that they had signed an online petition for public affairs or supported political activities online in the year before, only 21.2% had participated in offline demonstrations or protests (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4: Participation in online petitions, supporting online political activities, and offline demonstrations/protests

	Online petition/support Percent (N=968)	Offline demonstrations/protest Percent (N=993)
Never	52.4	78.8
Once or twice	29.1	16.8
Three to five times	14.1	3.5
More than six times	4.4	0.9

Source: Hong Kong Ideas Centre (2013), Figures 6.1, 6.2.

In terms of the mobilizing power of social media, one study found that while more than half of the respondents had been invited on online platforms to participate in offline social activities like public meetings, demonstrations, and petition drives (53.6%) (Table 2.5), 39.7% of them had actually participated in the activities offline. The main reason for the difference was “lack of time” (52.2%). In general, no significant difference was found between respondents’ preference for online versus offline participation, with 47.2% and 47.5% agreeing that they preferred online or offline political participation respectively.

Table 2.5: Did you receive an invitation through the following channels to participate in offline social movements like public meetings, demonstrations, and petition drives? (Multiple answers allowed)

	Percent (N=522)
Social networking sites	39.1
Instant messaging (e.g., WhatsApp, Twitter, WeChat, Line)	20.5
Email	4.9
Online discussion forums	3.8
Never received an invitation	45.2
Don’t know/Difficult to say	1.1

**The data are weighted.*

Source: The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups (2014b), Table 4.6.6.

A 2016 study constructed a four-group typology of youth political participation in a randomized mobile phone survey of 672 Hong Kong respondents aged 20–29 years. Many respondents were identified as “disengaged individuals” (42%), defined as those with the lowest intention to participate in offline or online political activities. Only 14% were categorized as “critical citizens” who participated actively in extra-representational activities, engaged in real-life party activities and online participation, and were enthusiastic online media content consumers who communicated digitally on a daily basis (Fu, Wong, Law, & Yip, 2016).

Chapter 3

Findings of the Telephone Survey

1. Introduction

In this chapter, we begin by introducing the coverage of the survey questionnaire. Second, we describe data management and the weighting employed. After illustrating the socio-demographic profiles of the respondents, we report the survey findings.

2. Coverage of the Survey Questionnaire

The questionnaire includes respondents' time and activities on social media, most frequently used social media platform, and intensity of Facebook use (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007); their major source of public affairs information; frequency of participation in various specific political activities, both online and offline (Tang & Lee, 2013; Vissers & Stolle, 2014); their satisfaction with the performance of and trust in the HKSAR Government; and their tolerance of five minority or non-conformist groups (recovered mental patients, people of other ethnicities, homosexuals, sex workers, and political radicals) (Lee, 2014). Socio-demographic characteristics and respondents' identification with Hong Kong are also elements of the questionnaire. The full questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 3.1.

3. Data Management and Weighting

All data were carefully validated, recoded, and analyzed using the SPSS statistical software package. In order to reflect the distribution of the population living in Hong Kong, all data were weighted by the proportion of gender, age, and education, according to the most recent statistics of people aged 15 or above issued by the Census and Statistics Department of the HKSAR Government. The survey findings presented in this report are weighted.

4. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Survey Respondents

The 829 respondents were equally split between males (50.5%) and females (49.5%). In terms of age, 28.5% of the respondents were 15 to 19 years old, 34.3% were between 20 and 24, and 36.2% were between 25 and 29. A majority of our respondents (77.8%) were born in Hong Kong, with 21.6% born somewhere else. In terms of education, 44.1% of the respondents were degree holders, and another 11.1% had received non-degree tertiary education. Another 36.9% reported senior secondary as the highest level of education attained at the time of the survey.

Our respondents had a strong sense of identification with Hong Kong, with 47.6% identifying themselves as "Hongkongers;" 37.5% said that they were "Hongkongers but also Chinese," but only 3.7% reported themselves as "Chinese" and 9.9% identified as "Chinese but also Hongkongers."

Table 3.1: Basic Socio-Demographic Profiles of the Respondents (Percent)


<i>Sex</i>	
Male	50.5
Female	49.5
<i>Age</i>	
15-19	28.5
20-24	34.3
25-29	36.2
Refused	1.0
<i>Place of birth</i>	
Hong Kong	77.8
Others	21.6
No answer/Refused	0.6
<i>Education</i>	
No formal education/ Kindergarten	0.5
Primary School	0.5
Junior Secondary School	6.0
Senior Secondary School	36.9
Tertiary, non-degree course	11.1
Tertiary, degree course	40.7
Graduate School (Master/Doctoral degree)	3.4
No answer/Refused	0.8
<i>Monthly household income</i>	
Below HK\$10,000	1.5
HK\$10,000 - <HK\$20,000	10.6
HK\$20,000 - < HK\$30,000	15.6
HK\$30,000 - < HK\$40,000	16.6
HK\$40,000 - < HK\$50,000	10.2
HK\$50,000 - < HK\$60,000	11.2
HK\$60,000 - < HK\$80,000	11.0
HK\$80,000 or above	11.5
No answer/Refused	11.7
<i>National Identity</i>	
Hongkonger	47.6
Hongkonger, but also Chinese	37.5
Chinese, but also Hongkonger	9.9
Chinese	3.7
No view/No answer	1.4

Note: The sum of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting.

5. Main Findings of the Telephone Survey

Youth's Use of Social Media and Facebook

More than half of respondents (53.6%) spent two to five hours online daily, broken down as follows: 18.4% (two to three hours), 20.7% (three to four hours), and 14.5% (four to five hours) (Figure 3.1).



Note: The sum of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting.

Figure 3.1: Time spent online daily.

As Table 3.2 shows, a large majority of respondents were active on social media (99.2%), with Facebook most frequently used (67.7%), followed by WhatsApp (14.4%), Instagram (12.2%), and WeChat (3.4%). Notably, Instagram was the second most frequently used among youth aged 15 to 19, and far more popular (29.2%) than in other age groups.

Table 3.2: Social media most frequently used by youth (Percent)

	Age 15-19	Age 20-24	Age 25-29	All social media users
<i>Facebook</i>	54.2	74.8	72.5	67.7
<i>Instagram</i>	29.2	9.0	2.0	12.2
<i>WhatsApp</i>	10.6	12.9	17.4	14.4
<i>WeChat</i>	3.4	1.1	5.7	3.4
<i>Sina Weibo</i>	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.7
<i>Twitter</i>	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.3
<i>Line</i>	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1
<i>Other</i>	1.7	1.1	1.0	1.2
<i>No answer</i>	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.1
Total	100.0 (236)	100.0 (278)	100.0 (298)	100.0 (817)

Note: The sum of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting.

Among a variety of social media activities, the most common one was “browse friends’ statuses” (24.1%), followed by “browse public affairs news” (20.9%), “instant messaging” (11.6%) and “browse living and lifestyle information”(10.1%) (Table 3.3a). After further analysis, the activities were categorized into seeking news, entertainment, and social communication, with social communication the most frequent activity among youth on social media (53.7%) (Table 3.3b).

Table 3.3a: Most frequent social media activities (*Instructions to interviewers: Read out options and obtain one answer*) (Percent of Internet users; N=825)

<i>Browse friends’ statuses</i>	24.1
<i>Browse public affairs news</i>	20.9
<i>Instant messaging</i>	11.6
<i>Browse information about living/lifestyles</i>	10.1
<i>Share others’ posts</i>	6.6
<i>Press ‘Like’ or other emotional buttons</i>	6.6
<i>Watch video</i>	3.9
<i>Browse information on entertainment</i>	3.8
<i>Browse comments</i>	3.2
<i>Update personal status</i>	2.5
<i>Post photos</i>	1.3
<i>Comment on others’ posts</i>	1.1
<i>Shopping</i>	0.4
<i>Listen to music</i>	0.3
<i>Play games</i>	0.2
<i>Other</i>	0.1
<i>No answer</i>	2.3
<i>Did not use social media</i>	0.9


Note: The sum of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting.

Table 3.3b: Categorization of most frequent social media activities (% of Internet users; N=825)

<i>Social communication</i>	53.7
<i>Seeking news</i>	24.1
<i>Entertainment</i>	18.8
<i>Others/No answer/Did not use social media</i>	3.4

Note: The data are weighted.

In terms of Facebook use, youth spent on average one to two hours on Facebook daily. More than half of respondents agreed that Facebook was part of their daily activity (with 35.6% and 22.5% stating that they “agree” and “strongly agree,” respectively). However, only 11.7% of respondents agreed that they would feel out of touch if they were not able to log onto Facebook for half a day (with 9.0% and 2.7% stating that they “agree” and “strongly agree,” respectively). More than half of youth did not have a strong sense of belonging to the Facebook community, with 55.7% indicating “half and half.”



Note: The data are weighted.

Figure 3.2: Time spent on Facebook daily.

Nearly half of our respondents obtained public affairs information on social media (46.4%). Traditional media such as television (21.7%), newspapers and magazines (13.1%), and radio (2.8%) were far less popular as primary information sources (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Primary source of public affairs information (Percent)

<i>Social media</i>	46.4
<i>Television</i>	21.7
<i>Websites</i>	15.5
<i>Newspapers/Magazines</i>	13.1
<i>Radio</i>	2.8
<i>No answer</i>	0.5

Note: The data are weighted.

Attitudes toward the HKSAR Government


In general, respondents had negative attitudes toward the HKSAR Government. Two thirds of the youth were dissatisfied with the government’s performance, with 33.6% being “quite dissatisfied” and 32.1% being “dissatisfied”, and 29.8% indicating “half and half.” Trust in the HKSAR Government was low. Nearly two thirds of the respondents distrusted the HKSAR Government (with 32.3% being “quite distrust” and 30.7% being “distrust”); 28.5% indicated “half and half” (Table 3.5). Regarding age group difference,

the 15–19 age cohort had a more positive attitude toward the HKSAR Government than older cohorts (Figure 3.3).

Table 3.5: Attitudes toward the HKSAR Government (Percent)

<i>Satisfaction with the performance of HKSAR Government</i>	
Very dissatisfied	33.6
Not quite satisfied	32.1
Half and half	29.8
Quite satisfied	2.4
Very satisfied	0.8
No answer	1.4
<i>Trust in the HKSAR Government</i>	
Very distrust	32.3
Quite distrust	30.7
Half and half	28.5
Quite trust	6.4
Very trust	1.4
No answer	0.7

Note: The sum of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting.



Note: The data are weighted.

Figure 3.3: Attitudes toward the HKSAR Government by age cohort.

In addition to attitudes toward the government, this study is interested in youth's political tolerance of five minority or non-conformist groups: people of other ethnicities, recovered mental patients, homosexuals, sex workers, and political radicals. The

respondents were asked how objectionable they would find it if these groups strove for their rights publicly. As Table 3.6 shows, the tolerance of recovered mental patients was the highest, while tolerance of political radicals was the lowest.

Table 3.6: Tolerance of minority or non-conformist groups in their public striving for rights (Percent)

	Not objectionable at all	A little objectionable	Somewhat objectionable	Strongly objectionable	No answer/Refused
<i>People of other ethnicities</i>	79.6	13.4	2.7	1.8	2.4
<i>Sex workers</i>	70.7	22.4	2.6	1.9	2.3
<i>Recovered mental patients</i>	87.7	8.9	1.0	1.0	1.3
<i>Homosexuals</i>	75.2	15.2	5.4	2.5	1.7
<i>Political radicals</i>	37.9	41.8	12.1	5.2	3.0

Note: The sum of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting.

Online and offline political participation

In the 12 months immediately prior to our survey, 75.2% of respondents had participated in political activities online. “Post or share political/public affairs information or comment online” was the most common activity, with 25.1% of the respondents indicating participation “once or twice,” 21.9% saying “several times,” and 12.3% indicating “often.” “‘Like’ or join any online group about politics or public affairs” were the second most common (24.1% “once or twice,” 16.1% “several times,” and 16.1% “often”). By contrast, “create an online group for politics or public affairs” was the least common, with 96.1% of youth reporting that they had no experience with it that activity (Table 3.7).

Table 3.7: Participation in online political activities (Percent)

	Never	Once or twice	Several times	Often
<i>Post or share political or public affairs information or comment online</i>	40.6	25.1	21.9	12.3
<i>‘Like’ or join any online group about politics or public affairs</i>	51.8	24.1	16.1	8.0
<i>Take part in an online demonstration, for example, ‘Like’ the page of an online demonstration</i>	60.6	21.8	10.9	6.7
<i>Sign an online petition for political or public affairs</i>	64.3	23.5	9.2	3.0
<i>Call upon others online to participate in</i>	69.2	20.0	7.4	3.4

<i>offline political activities, such as demonstration, election, etc.</i>				
<i>Buy products or support boycotts against any product for political, ethical, or environmental reasons expressed online</i>	77.9	16.2	4.2	1.8
<i>Donate or raise money online for political or public affairs</i>	91.1	7.0	1.2	0.6
<i>Contact a legislator or government official by means of the Internet</i>	95.2	2.9	1.2	0.7
<i>Create an online group for politics or public affairs</i>	96.1	2.3	1.2	0.4

Note: The sum of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting.

Compared to online political activities, a smaller proportion of youth (55.6%) participated in offline political activities. “Take part in an offline march or demonstration” was the most common, with 21.3%, 6.1%, and 0.9% of respondents reporting that they had participated “once or twice,” “several times,” and “often” respectively. The least common activity was “contact a legislator or government official for public affairs in person, by phone, or by letter,” with 93.6% of the respondents indicating that they had never done that (Table 3.8).

Table 3.8: Participation in offline political activities (Percent)

	Never	Once/twice	Several times	Often
<i>Take part in an offline march or demonstration</i>	71.5	21.3	6.1	0.9
<i>Wear or show a sign or symbol for any social movement (e.g. democracy movement, election)</i>	75.0	18.6	4.8	1.6
<i>Buy products or support boycotts against any product for political, ethical, or environmental reasons expressed offline</i>	77.8	15.4	4.4	2.4
<i>Participate in activities organized by any environmental or human rights organization</i>	78.4	19.0	1.9	0.7
<i>Donate or raise money offline for political or public affairs</i>	82.3	12.9	2.9	1.9
<i>Sign a paper petition</i>	84.9	12.5	2.2	0.4
<i>Participate in activities organized by any political party or organization</i>	85.6	11.4	2.2	0.8
<i>Contact a legislator or government official on public affairs in person, by phone, or by letter</i>	93.6	4.6	1.3	0.5

Note: The sum of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and weighting.

To facilitate a comparison of the degree of participation in different political activities, we constructed a composite score based on the answers to each activity. “Never” was given zero points, “once/twice” one point, “several times” two points, and “often” three points. As Table 3.9 shows, the composite scores for each activity ranged from one to

three, with higher scores indicating more frequent participation. The degree of their online and offline political participation is as follows. The percentage reporting “never” is shown in parentheses.

Table 3.9: Degree of online and offline political participation

	Raw Score	Percent
Online political participation		
<i>Post or share political or public affairs information or comment online</i>	1.06	(40.6%)
<i>'Like' or join any online group about politics or public affairs</i>	0.80	(51.8%)
<i>Take part in an online demonstration, as by pressing 'Like' the page of an online demonstration</i>	0.64	(60.6%)
<i>Sign an online petition relating to political or public affairs</i>	0.51	(64.3%)
<i>Call upon others online to participate in offline political activities, such as demonstrations, elections, etc.</i>	0.45	(69.2%)
<i>Buy products or support boycotts against any product for political, ethical, or environmental reasons expressed online</i>	0.30	(77.9%)
<i>Donate or raise money online for political or public affairs</i>	0.11	(91.1%)
<i>Contact a legislator or government official by means of the Internet</i>	0.08	(95.2%)
<i>Create an online group for politics or public affairs</i>	0.06	(96.1%)
Offline political participation		
<i>Take part in an offline march or demonstration</i>	0.36	(71.6%)
<i>Wear or show a sign or symbol for any social movement (e.g., democracy movement, election)</i>	0.33	(75.0%)
<i>Buy products or support boycotts against any product for political, ethical, or environmental reasons expressed offline</i>	0.31	(77.8%)
<i>Participate in activities organized by any environmental or human rights organization</i>	0.25	(78.4%)
<i>Donate or raise money offline for political or public affairs</i>	0.24	(82.3%)
<i>Sign a paper petition</i>	0.18	(84.9%)
<i>Participate in activities organized by any political party or organization</i>	0.18	(85.6%)
<i>Contact a legislator or government official for public affairs in person, by phone, or by letter</i>	0.08	(93.6%)

Note: The data are weighted.

Apart from the offline activities above, 61.5% of eligible youth voted in the 2016 Legislative Council Election.

Relationship between the use of social media as the primary source of public affairs information, and political attitudes, political participation, and political tolerance

As Table 3.10 shows, youth who reported that social media was their primary source of public affairs information were significantly less satisfied with the performance of the

HKSAR Government, less trust the HKSAR Government, showed a higher degree of online and offline political participation, and had significantly more turnout in the 2016 Legislative Council Election. With regard to the overall degree of political tolerance, youth whose primary information source was social media showed more tolerance toward five non-conformist groups, although significant differences were observed in levels of tolerance toward people of other ethnicities, sex workers, and political radicals.

Table 3.10: Difference in major public affairs information sources in attitudes toward the HKSAR Government and political participation (Percent)

	Social media	Non-social media
<i>***Satisfaction with the performance of the HKSAR Government</i>		
Very dissatisfied	45.2%	24.3%
Not quite satisfied	36.2%	29.4%
Half and half	18.5%	40.4%
Quite satisfied	0.0	4.6%
Very satisfied	0.0	1.4%
<i>***Trust in the HKSAR Government</i>		
Very distrust	43.8%	22.6%
Quite distrust	33.9%	28.5%
Half and half	21.0%	35.5%
Quite trust	1.3%	10.9%
Very trust	0.0%	2.5%
<i>***Voted in the 2016 Legislative Council Election</i>		
Yes	67.8%	56.0%
No	32.2%	44.0%
<i>***Composite degree of online political participation</i>		
Adjusted mean	1.58	1.33
Adjusted standard deviation	0.48	0.43
<i>***Composite degree of offline political participation</i>		
Adjusted mean	1.30	1.20
Adjusted standard deviation	0.37	0.31
<i>**Degree of tolerance of people of other ethnicities</i>		
Adjusted mean	3.81	3.70
Adjusted standard deviation	0.49	0.67
<i>*Degree of tolerance of sex workers</i>		

Adjusted mean	3.71	3.61
Adjusted standard deviation	0.55	0.68
<i>Degree of tolerance of recovered mental patients</i>		
Adjusted mean	3.89	3.83
Adjusted standard deviation	0.40	0.49
<i>Degree of tolerance of homosexuals</i>		
Adjusted mean	3.69	3.64
Adjusted standard deviation	0.67	0.71
<i>***Degree of tolerance of political radicals</i>		
Adjusted mean	3.26	3.01
Adjusted standard deviation	0.75	0.90
<i>***Composite degree of tolerance of five minority or non-conformist groups</i>		
Adjusted mean	3.69	3.56
Adjusted standard deviation	0.31	0.44

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Note: The data are weighted.

Chapter 4 Summary and Discussion

1. Background

Youth in Hong Kong have limited access to formal political institutions and policymaking processes. However, given their sense of profound political and social injustice and inequality and frustration with upward social immobility, youth are increasingly moving to the center stage of social development debates through other channels and becoming involved in the decisions that will shape society today and tomorrow.

In a number of social movements in which youth acted as agents with powerful voices, social media was widely adopted to share information and to facilitate mobilization and collaboration among large numbers of people, both online and offline. Therefore, there is a growing concern that social media operates as a catalyst for youth radicalization.

The specific objectives of the current study were as follows:

- (1) To examine Hong Kong youth's social media behaviors and sources of public affairs information;
- (2) To investigate youth's attitudes toward the HKSAR Government;
- (3) To study the frequency of youth participation in different kinds of online and offline political activities;
- (4) To examine youth's tolerance of minority or non-conformist groups;
- (5) To analyze the relationship between youth's social media use and their political participation and attitudes toward the HKSAR Government and non-conformist groups; and
- (6) On the basis of the study's findings, to understand the role of youth in social change and to generate impactful policy recommendations for facilitating communication between government and youth that will strengthen youth participation in politics and the development of civil society.

2. Summary of research findings

The methodology and main findings of the telephone survey are summarized as follows:

- (1) A territory-wide representative telephone survey of 829 Hong Kong youth aged 15 to 29 was conducted between 24 October and 24 November, 2016. The response rate was 70%.

- (2) Social media has penetrated into all areas of the lives of today's youth. Social communication, such as browsing friends' statuses, instant messaging, and sharing others' posts, was the major category of youth's social media activity. Facebook was the most frequently used social media platform for two thirds of our respondents (67.7%).
- (3) Social media was youth's primary source of information of public affairs. Together with websites, new media dominated the channels that youth employ to obtain such information (61.9%).
- (4) Hong Kong youth generally had negative attitudes toward the HKSAR Government. Only 3.2% of them were quite or very satisfied with the government, and 7.8% of them quite or very trust the government. The cohort aged 20–24 showed the highest level of dissatisfaction and distrust, while the 15–19 age group had relatively positive attitudes toward the government, contrary to the argument on the impact of liberal studies at secondary school on the radicalization of youth.
- (5) Youth exhibited a strong sense of identification with Hong Kong, with 47.6% identifying themselves as "Hongkongers" and 37.5% said that they were "Hongkongers but also Chinese."
- (6) Youth had a generally high degree of tolerance toward minority or non-conformist groups who strive for their rights in public. Notably, among the five groups that were arguably some of the most likely targets of intolerance in Hong Kong, it was the political radicals whom most youth find somewhat or strongly objectionable (17.3%).
- (7) Youth participated in political activities more actively online than offline. Out of a composite score indicating the frequency of participation, "Post or share political or public affairs information or comment online" received the highest score (1.06 out of an adjusted mean score of 0 to 3). Regarding offline political participation, "Take part in an offline march or demonstration" received the highest score, 0.36. However, the generally low scores indicate that only a small percentage of youth transformed their discontent or online political expression into offline social action, contrary to the public impression that radical behaviors were common among the youth population.
- (8) Youth whose primary source of information of public affairs was social media were significantly more likely to be dissatisfied with the HKSAR Government, distrust the Government, tolerate minority or non-conformist groups, participate in online and offline political activities, and identify themselves as Hongkongers than youth who obtained public affairs information from non-social media channels.

It should be noted that no causal relationships between youth's social media use and their political attitudes or political participation were uncovered in the present study.

3. Recommendations for facilitating communication between government and youth and strengthening youth participation in politics and the development of civil society

Our study has yielded a comprehensive picture of youth's social media use and political participation in general. As future pillars of society, youth should be empowered to take part in political arena and public life. Although youth are increasingly critical of the HKSAR Government and have a growing list of grievances, the concern that youth have become problematic and radical is still unfounded. Therefore, the government should put aside stereotypes about youth and open channels to communicate with them and listen genuinely to their aspirations and concerns.

The penetration of social media has made it an important channel of dialogue between youth and other stakeholders in society, particularly government officials and policymakers. The government should build an online or social media platform to listen to youth's views and communicate with them proactively, so as to establish mutual understanding and trust and mobilize civic participation among youth.

In what follows, we offer recommendations on ways to strengthen dialogue between youth and other stakeholders in politics so as to create an enabling environment for inclusive and meaningful engagement with and participation of youth.

- (1) As new digital media, which circumvents traditional gatekeepers of information, has become a major source of public affairs information for youth, it is important to improve the youth's media literacy. More guidance should be given to help youth judge the credibility of the information and apply fact-checking strategies. To reduce the echo chamber effect found in social media, more innovative intervention should be undertaken to help individuals become exposed to divergent views and develop a relatively independent attitude toward a variety of issues.
- (2) Widespread negative information and critical comments about the government through social media channel would likely make youth exposed to such information develop dissenting attitudes toward the government. Although no causal relationship is drawn in the present study, given the deep penetration of social media in youth's life, it is urgent for the Government to establish a more positive image on this platform.
- (3) Youth liked to express their opinions and attitudes toward politics or social issues in varied ways online. Their opinions should be respected and accommodated, especially in the policymaking process. Policymakers and relevant officials involved in policy debates should be equipped with social media skills to understand the youth's behaviors and discourse online and respond to their concerns. They would then interact with the youth in a more open and friendly way. To facilitate the establishment and enforcement of effective policy, it is worth their spending time listening to the various needs of today's youth.
- (4) Young people have demonstrated their passion, ability, and potential to be positive agents of change in their community and in the broader society. Some values they

embrace—freedom, democracy, sustainable development, justice, etc.—are also found widely among the general public. However, not many young people are willing to engage in the political arena and public life in general. One reason reported in other studies was that youth felt powerless in traditional political development processes.

In view of this, the government and other political and social institutions should discard stereotypes about youth radicalization, trying instead to provide more opportunities for youth to apply their creativity and offer their perspectives and thus remove barriers to youth participation. Both formal and informal political participation are beneficial for a vivid and resilient democracy, so the government should not only establish inclusive policies and mechanisms to support and promote youth participation in formal political processes, but also respect their engagement on informal platforms. Social media can be skillfully utilized to promote civic engagement among them and nurture them to become responsible stakeholders in society. Given that social communication is youth's major activity on social media, it would be effective to use peer-to-peer contact within youth's social networks to promote and facilitate such engagement.

- (5) It should be noted that one fifth of the young respondents (20.4%) had never participated in political activities, either online or offline. Their silence can make them an isolated group in the policymaking process. It is necessary to investigate more deeply the reasons for their absence from political activities and take appropriate measures to encourage them to voice their needs.
- (6) Given youth's high degree of tolerance for marginalized groups, they should be empowered to bridge the dialogue between these groups and the general public, so as to create an inclusive society.

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Appendix 1.1: An Overview of the Fieldwork for the Telephone Survey

「青年政治參與和社交媒體使用」意見調查

調查概況

調查方法	以隨機抽樣的方式，利用電腦輔助電話訪問系統，由訪問員進行電話訪問	
調查日期	2016年10月24-26、11月2-5、7-11、14-18、21-24日(共21天)	
調查對象	15至29歲，能操粵語的香港市民	
抽樣方法	將通訊事務局已經發出的手提電話號碼字頭(首四位數字)，編配 0000 至 9999 共一千組的四位數字於每個號碼的後方，做成一個電話號碼庫。從這個電話號碼庫中隨機抽出號碼，並跟據過往經驗盡量剔除無效號碼。	
電話號碼的處理方法	撥出的電話號碼若遇無人接聽、線路繁忙等，電腦系統會安排訪問員在不同日期或時段再次致電，致電三次皆未能成功訪問，便會停止致電該號碼；但若有一次被拒絕，便會立刻停止致電。	
樣本數目	829 個成功個案	
抽樣誤差	± 3.4% 以內 (可信度設於 95%；即代表有 95% 信心，百分比誤差會在這範圍以內。)	
回應率	70 %	
以下為撥出電話號碼的情況，以及回應率的計算方法：		
撥出電話號碼總數 (Total)		123374
A. 確定不可以做訪問的電話號碼數目 (Ineligibles)		62577
A1. 無效號碼	55930	
A2. 非住宅	162	
A3. 傳真 / 數據機 / 傳呼機	229	
A4. 無合適被訪者	6256	
B. 未確定有合適被訪者的電話號碼數目 (Unknown)		59606
B1. 無人接聽 (包括電話錄音)	36752	
B2. 線路繁忙	2699	
B3. 需輸入密碼	48	
B4. 長途電話	637	
B5. 掛線前仍未確定有合適被訪者	19470	
C. 確定有合適被訪者的電話號碼數目 (Eligibles)		1191
C1. 拒絕訪問 (包括訪問中途拒絕)	277	
C2. 合適的被訪者未能在調查期間接受或完成訪問	85	
C3. 成功訪問 (Completed)	829	
回應率的計算方法		
Completed / Eligibles		
= 829 / 1191		
= 0.6961 (即 70%)		

Appendix 3.1: Questionnaire from the Telephone Survey 「青年政治參與和社交媒體使用」意見調查

介紹

你好。呢度係中文大學 傳播與民意調查中心 打嚟架，我哋受中大教授委託，做緊一項有關「社交媒體使用同社會事務」嘅意見調查，啲題目好簡單，想訪問 15 至 29 歲嘅人。

確定

請問先生/小姐/女士 你依家係唔係 15 至 29 歲嘅香港永久居民呢？

- 係
- 唔係 【讀出「唔好意思，我哋想訪問 15 至 29 歲嘅香港永久居民，拜拜。」，終止問卷】

DM1. 性別 【不用問】

1. 男
2. 女

Q1. 你每日平均用幾多時間上網呢？

1. 無上網 （跳至 Q11）
2. 1 至 30 分鐘
3. 31 分鐘至 60 分鐘
4. 1 個多小時
5. 2 個多小時
6. 3 個多小時
7. 4 個多小時
8. 5 個多小時
9. 6 個多小時
10. 7 個多小時
11. 8 個多小時
12. 9 個多小時
13. 10 小時或以上
14. 唔知 / 拒答

Online Political Participation

Q2. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常喺網上簽署有關政治或公共事務嘅聲明或者請願書呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？

- Q3. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常喺網上籌款或者網上捐錢支持一啲有關政治或公共事務嘅活動呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q4. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常喺網上聯絡政府官員或者議員呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q5. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常喺網上呼籲其他人參與政治活動，例如呼籲上街示威、呼籲投票等？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q6. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常因為政治、道德或者環保既原因，喺網上購買或聲援杯葛某啲產品呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q7. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常喺網上發表或者轉載有關政治或公共事務嘅評論或資訊呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q8. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常參與網上示威活動，例如 Like 某個示威活動嘅專頁呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q9. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常喺網上建立有關政治或公共事務嘅群組呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q10. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常喺網上加入或者 Like 一啲同政治或公共事務有關嘅組群呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？

Offline Political Participation

頭先問咗一啲網上政治參與嘅情況，以下係有關網絡以外嘅政治活動。

- Q11. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常因為一啲社會事務而親身或者透過書信、電話聯絡政府官員或者議員？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q12. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常簽署聲明或者請願書？網上唔計嘅。係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q13. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常現場親身參與遊行示威或者抗議行動？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q14. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常捐錢支持一啲有關政治或公共事務嘅活動，又或者為其籌款呢？網上捐款或籌款唔計嘅。係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q15. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常因為政治、道德或者環保既原因，而親身購買或聲援杯葛某啲產品？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？
- Q16. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常親身佩戴或者展示同某個社會運動相關嘅標記？【例子：助選運動、民主運動】係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？

Q17. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常參與任何環保團體或者人權團體既活動呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？

Q18. 過去十二個月，你有幾經常參與任何政黨或者政治團體舉辦既活動呢？係無、一兩次、幾次、定係經常？

1. 無
2. 做過一兩次
3. 做過幾次
4. 經常做
5. 唔知
6. 拒答

Attitudes toward the HKSAR Government

Q19. 整體黎講，你滿唔滿意香港特區政府既表現呢？係非常唔滿意、幾唔滿意、一般、幾滿意，定係非常滿意？

1. 非常唔滿意
2. 幾唔滿意
3. 一般
4. 幾滿意
5. 非常滿意
6. 唔知
7. 拒答

Q20. 整體黎講，你信唔信任香港特區政府呢？係非常唔信任、幾唔信任、一般、幾信任，定係非常信任？

1. 非常唔信任
2. 幾唔信任
3. 一般
4. 幾信任
5. 非常信任
6. 唔知
7. 拒答

Q21. 你最主要從以下邊個途徑得知有關時事同公共事務既資訊呢？係報紙、雜誌、電台、電視、網站，定係社交媒體呢？(只選一項)

1. 報紙或雜誌
2. 電台
3. 電視
4. 網站
5. 社交媒體
6. 唔知
7. 拒答

Use of Social Media

Q22. 依家有唔同種類嘅社交媒體，例如 facebook、instagram、微博、whatsapp、wechat 等。請講出你喺社交媒體上最經常做嘅一件事（不讀出以下選項）
（如在 Q1 答無上網，就唔問 Q22 至 Q29）

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. 瀏覽時事新聞 | 12. Share 其他人 post 嘅嘢 |
| 2. 瀏覽娛樂資訊 | 13. Post 相 |
| 3. 瀏覽生活資訊 | 14. Check-in / 打卡 |
| 4. 瀏覽評論 | 15. 打機 |
| 5. 睇片 | 16. 購物 |
| 6. 聽音樂 | 17. 直播 |
| 7. 即時通訊 | 18. 其它 (請註明) |
| 8. 瀏覽朋友狀態 | 19. 無答案 |
| 9. 更新個人狀態 (Update status) | 20. 完全冇用社交媒體 (跳至 Q30) |
| 10. 按'Like'或其它表情符號 | 21. 拒答 |
| 11. Comment 其他人 post 嘅嘢 | |

Q23. 你最經常用邊一個社交媒體呢？

- | | |
|--------------------|--------------|
| 1. Facebook | 7. Line |
| 2. Instagram | 8. Skype |
| 3. Sina Weibo / 微博 | 9. Google+ |
| 4. Twitter | 10. 其他 (請註明) |
| 5. Whatsapp | 11. 唔知 |
| 6. Wechat (微信) | 12. 拒答 |

Q24. 【Q23 答 facebook 的被訪者不用回答此題】

你有冇用 Facebook?

1. 冇 (跳至 Q30)
2. 有
3. 拒絕回答(跳至 Q30)

Q25. 你最常用嘅嗰個 Facebook account 有幾多個 Facebook friends 呢？

1. 1 – 100 人
2. 101 – 250 人
3. 251 – 500 人
4. 501 - 1000 人
5. 1001 – 1500 人
6. 1501 – 2000 人
7. 2001 人或以上
8. 無答案 / 拒絕回答

Q26. 你每日平均用幾多時間用 Facebook 呢？

1. 少過 30 分鐘
2. 31 分鐘至 60 分鐘
3. 1 個多小時
4. 2 個多小時
5. 3 個多小時
6. 4 個多小時
7. 5 個多小時
8. 6 個多小時
9. 7 個多小時
10. 8 個多小時
11. 9 個多小時
12. 10 小時或以上
13. 唔知 / 拒答

跟住想知道你有幾同意以下嘅句子。

Q27. 「用 Facebook 係你每日活動嘅一部分」係非常唔同意、幾唔同意、一般、幾同意，定係非常同意？

Q28. 「如果你有大約半日冇得用 Facebook，你會覺得自己好似同外界失去聯繫」係非常唔同意、幾唔同意、一般、幾同意，定係非常同意？

Q29. 「你覺得自己係 Facebook 社群中嘅一份子」係非常唔同意、幾唔同意、一般、幾同意，定係非常同意？

1. 非常唔同意
2. 幾唔同意
3. 一般
4. 幾同意
5. 非常同意
6. 無答案
7. 拒答

Political Tolerance

你會唔會因以下五類人嘅一啲行為而反感呢？

Q30. 如果同你唔同種族既人公開爭取佢哋嘅權益，你係完全唔反感、少少反感、幾反感，定係非常反感呢？

Q31. 如果性工作者公開爭取佢哋嘅權益，你係完全唔反感、少少反感、幾反感，定係非常反感呢？

Q32. 如果精神病康復者公開爭取佢哋嘅權益，你係完全唔反感、少少反感、幾反感，定係非常反感呢？

Q33. 如果同性戀者公開爭取佢哋嘅權益，你係完全唔反感、少少反感、幾反感，定係非常反感呢？

Q34. 如果政治立場激進既人公開宣揚佢哋嘅理念，你係完全唔反感、少少反感、幾反感，定係非常反感呢？

1. 完全唔反感
2. 少少反感
3. 幾反感
4. 非常反感
5. 唔知
6. 拒答

「最後想問一啲基本資料，只係用嚟做統計分析。」

DM2. 請問你依家幾多歲呢？

____歲

30. 拒答

DM3. 【15 至 17 歲的被訪者不用回答此題】

喺今年 9 月嘅立法會選舉中，你有冇投票呢？

1. 冇
2. 有
3. 唔記得
4. 拒答

DM4. 你覺得你係乜野人呢？有四個答案嘅，1 係香港人、2 係中國人、3 係香港人，但都係中國人、4 係中國人，但都係香港人。

- 1 香港人
- 2 中國人
- 3 係香港人，但都係中國人
- 4 係中國人，但都係香港人
- 5 其他（如澳門或其他國籍人士）
- 6 無意見 / 無答案

DM5. 請問你係唔係香港出世呢？

1. 唔係
2. 係
3. 唔知道
4. 拒答

DM6. 請問你接受教育到乜嘢程度呢？

- | | |
|---------------|----------------|
| 1 無正式教育 / 幼稚園 | 6 專上：學士學位課程 |
| 2 小學 | 7 研究院（碩士、博士課程） |
| 3 初中 | 8 其他（註明_____） |

- 4 高中
- 5 專上：非學位課程

9 唔知／拒答

DM7. 請問你屋企，每個月嘅家庭總收入大約係幾多呢？

(包括人工、生意收入、儲蓄利息、投資利潤、領取綜援、生果金等)

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 1 \$5,999 或以下 | 7 \$30,000 – \$39,999 |
| 2 \$6,000 – \$9,999 | 8 \$40,000 – \$49,999 |
| 3 \$10,000 – \$14,999 | 9 \$50,000 – \$59,999 |
| 4 \$15,000 – \$19,999 | 10 \$60,000 – \$79,999 |
| 5 \$20,000 – \$24,999 | 11 \$80,000 或以上 |
| 6 \$25,000 – \$29,999 | 12 唔知／拒答 |